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ID: 474673.0, MPI für Evolutionsbiologie / Evolutionary ecology
Evolutionary games in the multiverse
Authors:Gokhale, Chaitanya S.; Traulsen, Arne
Date of Publication (YYYY-MM-DD):2010-03-23
Title of Journal:Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
Journal Abbrev.:PNAS
Issue / Number:12
Start Page:5500
End Page:5504
Review Status:not specified
Audience:Not Specified
Abstract / Description:Evolutionary game dynamics of two players with two strategies has been studied in great detail. These games have been used to model many biologically relevant scenarios, ranging from social dilemmas in mammals to microbial diversity. Some of these games may, in fact, take place between a number of individuals and not just between two. Here we address one-shot games with multiple players. As long as we have only two strategies, many results from two-player games can be generalized to multiple players. For games with multiple players and more than two strategies, we show that statements derived for pairwise interactions no longer hold. For two-player games with any number of strategies there can be at most one isolated internal equilibrium. For any number of players Graphic with any number of strategies Graphic, there can be at most Graphic isolated internal equilibria. Multiplayer games show a great dynamical complexity that cannot be captured based on pairwise interactions. Our results hold for any game and can easily be applied to specific cases, such as public goods games or multiplayer stag hunts.
Free Keywords:evolutionary dynamics; multiplayer games; multiple strategies
replicator dynamics; finite populations
External Publication Status:published
Document Type:Article
Affiliations:MPI für Evolutionsbiologie/Abt. Evolutionsökologie
MPI für Evolutionsbiologie/AG Evolutionstheorie
Identifiers:ISSN:0027-8424 (print) [ID-No:1]
ISSN:1091-6490 (online) [ID-No:2]
DOI:10.1073/pnas.0912214107 [ID-No:3]
LOCALID:2748/S 39078 [Listen-Nummer/S-Nummer]
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