Home News About Us Contact Contributors Disclaimer Privacy Policy Help FAQ

Home
Search
Quick Search
Advanced
Fulltext
Browse
Collections
Persons
My eDoc
Session History
Login
Name:
Password:
Documentation
Help
Support Wiki
Direct access to
document ID:


          Institute: MPI für Ökonomik     Collection: Strategic Interaction Group     Display Documents



  history
ID: 277654.0, MPI für Ökonomik / Strategic Interaction Group
Membership Rule and Strategic Alliances : An Experimental Approach
Authors:Apesteguia, Jose; Pantz, Katinka; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony
Language:English
Place of Publication:Jena
Publisher:Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Wirtschaftssystemen
Date of Publication (YYYY-MM-DD):2003
Total Number of Pages:35
Title of Series:Papers on Strategic Interaction
Issue / Number:35-2003
Corporate Body (Series Editor):Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Wirtschaftssystemen
Review Status:Internal review
Audience:Not Specified
Abstract / Description:Recently, new game theoretic approaches have been suggested that address the emergence of inter-firm collaborative agreements (strategic alliances) that are situated between standard market transactions of unrelated companies and their integration by means of mergers and acquisitions. This paper experimentally investigates the interdependence between two membership rules and the endogenously emerging interfirm collaborative structures. In the implemented frameworks, the formation of coalitions between competing firms is modelled as a two-stage non-cooperative game. On a first stage firms form collaborative coalitions in order to decrease their marginal costs of production. Consecutively, firms compete on the market. More precisely, we look at the coalition formation models of Bloch [RAND Journal of Economics, 26, 1995; Games and Economic Behavior, 14, 1996] who applies an exclusive membership rule and contrast it with a setting in which an open membership rule such as suggested in Yi [RAND Journal of Economics, 29, 1998] prevails. While in the former setting a firm can enter into a coalition only if all existing members of the coalition agree, in the latter setting a firm does not need the consent of anybody to join a coalition. In addition to comparing the behavior under the regimes of the two mentioned membership rules, we compare these baseline settings to others into which we introduce coalition formation costs increasing linearly with coalition size.
Free Keywords:endogenous formation of coalitions; R&D; cournot competition; collusion; experiments
Classification / Thesaurus:JEL Classification: C92; D43
External Publication Status:published
Document Type:Paper
Affiliations:MPI für Ökonomik/Abteilung Strategische Interaktion
Identifiers:ISSN:1618-7547
Full Text:
You have privileges to view the following file(s):
2003-35[1].pdf  [554,00 Kb]   
 
The scope and number of records on eDoc is subject to the collection policies defined by each institute - see "info" button in the collection browse view.