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          Institute: MPI für Evolutionsbiologie     Collection: Evolutionary ecology     Display Documents



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ID: 330169.0, MPI für Evolutionsbiologie / Evolutionary ecology
Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity
Authors:Sommerfeld, Ralf D.; Krambeck, Hans-Jürgen; Semmann, Dirk; Milinski, Manfred
Language:English
Date of Publication (YYYY-MM-DD):2007-10
Title of Journal:Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
Journal Abbrev.:PNAS
Volume:104
Issue / Number:44
Start Page:17435
End Page:17440
Review Status:not specified
Audience:Not Specified
Abstract / Description:Communication about social topics is abundant in human societies, and many functions have been attributed to such gossiping. One of these proposed functions is the management of reputations. Reputation by itself has been shown to have a strong influence on cooperation dynamics in games of indirect reciprocity, and this notion helps to explain the observed high level of cooperation in humans. Here we designed a game to test a widespread assumption that gossip functions as a vector for the transmission of social information. This empirical study (with 14 groups of nine students each) focuses on the composition of gossip, information transfer by gossip, and the behavior based on gossip information. We show that gossip has a strong influence on the resulting behavior even when participants have access to the original information (i.e., direct observation) as well as gossip about the same information. Thus, it is evident that gossip has a strong manipulative potential. Furthermore, gossip about cooperative individuals is more positive than gossip about uncooperative individuals, gossip comments transmit social information successfully, and cooperation levels are higher when people encounter positive compared with negative gossip.
Free Keywords:cooperation; reputation; language; manipulation
External Publication Status:published
Document Type:Article
Version Comment:Automatic journal name synchronization
Affiliations:MPI für Limnologie/Abt. Evolutionsökologie
External Affiliations:Univ Vienna, Fac Math, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
Identifiers:ISSN:0027-8424 [ID-No:1]
DOI:10.1073/pnas.0704598104 [ID-No:2]
LOCALID:2580/S 38738 [Listen-Nummer/S-Nummer]
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