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          Institute: MPI für Ökonomik     Collection: Strategic Interaction Group     Display Documents

ID: 333781.0, MPI für Ökonomik / Strategic Interaction Group
Moral Distance and Moral Motivations in Dictator Game
Authors:Aguiar, Fernando; Branas-Garza, Pablo; Miller, Luis M.
Date of Publication (YYYY-MM-DD):2007-07-24
Total Number of Pages:25
Title of Series:Jena economic research papers (JERP)
Issue / Number:2007-47
Corporate Body (Series Editor):Friedrich Schiller Universität Jena; Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik
Review Status:Internal review
Audience:Not Specified
Abstract / Description:We perform an experimenta linvestigation using a dictator game in which individuals must make a moral decision —to give or not to give an amount of money to poor people in the Third World. A questionnaire in which the subjects are asked about the reasons for their decision shows that, at least in this case, moral motivations carry a heavy weight in the decision: the majority of dictators give the money for reasons of a consequentialist nature. Based on the results presented here and of other analogous experiments, we conclude that dicator behavior can be understood in terms of moral distance rather than social distance and that it systematically deviates from the egoism assumption in economic models and game theory.
Free Keywords:dictator game; moral distance; moral motivations; experimental economics
Classification / Thesaurus:JEL Classification: A13; C72: C91
External Publication Status:published
Document Type:Paper
Affiliations:MPI für Ökonomik/Abteilung Strategische Interaktion
Relations:Is Version Of-:Judgment and Decision Making, 3(2008)4, pp. 344-354
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