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          Institute: MPI für Evolutionsbiologie     Collection: Evolutionary ecology     Display Documents



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ID: 367891.0, MPI für Evolutionsbiologie / Evolutionary ecology
The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate change
Authors:Milinski, Manfred; Sommerfeld, Ralf D.; Krambeck, Hans-Jürgen; Reed, Floyd A.; Marotzke, Jochem
Language:English
Date of Publication (YYYY-MM-DD):2008-02-19
Title of Journal:Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA
Journal Abbrev.:PNAS
Volume:105
Issue / Number:7
Start Page:2291
End Page:2294
Review Status:not specified
Audience:Not Specified
Abstract / Description:Will a group of people reach a collective target through individual contributions when everyone suffers individually if the target is missed? This "collective-risk social dilemma" exists in various social scenarios, the globally most challenging one being the prevention of dangerous climate change. Reaching the collective target requires individual sacrifice, with benefits to all but no guarantee that others will also contribute. It even seems tempting to contribute less and save money to induce others to contribute more, hence the dilemma and the risk of failure. Here, we introduce the collective-risk social dilemma and simulate it in a controlled experiment: Will a group of people reach a fixed target sum through successive monetary contributions, when they know they will lose all their remaining money with a certain probability if they fail to reach the target sum? We find that, under high risk of simulated dangerous climate change, half of the groups succeed in reaching the target sum, whereas the others only marginally fail. When the risk of loss is only as high as the necessary average investment or even lower, the groups generally fail to reach the target sum. We conclude that one possible strategy to relieve the collective-risk dilemma in high-risk situations is to convince people that failure to invest enough is very likely to cause grave financial loss to the individual. Our analysis describes the social window humankind has to prevent dangerous climate change.
Free Keywords:cooperation; public good; threshold
External Publication Status:published
Document Type:Article
Affiliations:MPI für Evolutionsbiologie/Abt. Evolutionsökologie
External Affiliations:Univ Maryland, Dept Biol, College Pk, MD 20742 USA; Max Planck Inst Meteorol, Dept Ocean Earth Syst, D-21046 Hamburg, Germany
Identifiers:ISSN:0027-8424 [ID-No:1]
DOI:10.1073/pnas.0709546105 [ID-No:2]
LOCALID:2621/S 38800 [Listen-Nummer/S-Nummer]
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