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          Institute: MPI für Evolutionsbiologie     Collection: Evolutionary ecology     Display Documents

ID: 572979.0, MPI für Evolutionsbiologie / Evolutionary ecology
Cooperative interaction of rich and poor can be catalyzed by intermediate climate targets
Authors:Milinski, Manfred; Röhl, Torsten; Marotzke, Jochem
Date of Publication (YYYY-MM-DD):2011-12
Title of Journal:Climatic Change
Issue / Number:3-4
Start Page:807
End Page:814
Review Status:not specified
Audience:Not Specified
Abstract / Description:International climate negotiations that aim at reducing global greenhouse gas emissions are strongly influenced by a conflict between rich and poor countries and by a lack of consensus about the urgency of emission reduction measures. We have previously in an experimental game characterised the implied challenge of avoiding dangerous climate change as the “collective-risk social dilemma”. Here we introduce heterogeneous wealth and two time horizons into the collective-risk social dilemma game. We show that rich players are willing to substitute for missing contributions by the poor, provided the players collectively face intermediate climate targets that, if not reached, are potentially followed by simulated intermediate costly climate risks. However, despite some increase in the contributions of the rich against the final collective target, the final target is reached less often than the intermediate target. Our results provide experimental evidence that similar, intermediate time horizons between climate risks and climate change mitigation planning are a necessary, though not sufficient, component of successful climate negotiations.
External Publication Status:published
Document Type:Article
Communicated by:Brigitte Lechner
Affiliations:MPI für Evolutionsbiologie/Abt. Evolutionsökologie
External Affiliations:Department "The Ocean in the Earth System", Max Planck Institute for Meteorology, Bundesstrasse 53, 20146 Hamburg, Germany
Identifiers:ISSN:0165-0009 (print) [ID-No:1]
ISSN:1573-1480 (online) [ID-No:2]
DOI:10.1007/s10584-011-0319-y [ID-No:3]
LOCALID:2874/S 39218 [Listen-Nummer/S-Nummer]
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