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          Institute: MPI für Evolutionsbiologie     Collection: Evolutionary ecology     Display Documents



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ID: 573383.0, MPI für Evolutionsbiologie / Evolutionary ecology
To qualify as a social partner, humans hide severe punishment, although their observed cooperativeness is decisive
Authors:Rockenbach, Bettina; Milinski, Manfred
Language:English
Date of Publication (YYYY-MM-DD):2011-11-08
Title of Journal:Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
Journal Abbrev.:PNAS
Volume:108
Issue / Number:45
Start Page:18307
End Page:18312
Review Status:not specified
Audience:Not Specified
Abstract / Description:Conflicts of interest between the community and its members are at the core of human social dilemmas. If observed selfishness has future costs, individuals may hide selfish acts but display altruistic ones, and peers aim at identifying the most selfish persons to avoid them as future social partners. An interaction involving hiding and seeking information may be inevitable. We staged an experimental social-dilemma game in which actors could pay to conceal information about their contribution, giving, and punishing decisions from an observer who selects her future social partners from the actors. The observer could pay to conceal her observation of the actors. We found sophisticated dynamic strategies on either side. Actors hide their severe punishment and low contributions but display high contributions. Observers select high contributors as social partners; remarkably, punishment behavior seems irrelevant for qualifying as a social partner. That actors nonetheless pay to conceal their severe punishment adds a further puzzle to the role of punishment in human social behavior. Competition between hiding and seeking information about social behavior may be even more relevant and elaborate in the real world but usually is hidden from our eyes.
Free Keywords:cooperation; economic experiment; signaling
External Publication Status:published
Document Type:Article
Communicated by:Brigitte Lechner
Affiliations:MPI für Evolutionsbiologie/Abt. Evolutionsökologie
External Affiliations:Department of Economics, University of Cologne, D-50923 Cologne, Germany
Identifiers:ISSN:0027-8424 (print) [ID-No:1]
ISSN:1091-6490 (online) [ID-No:2]
DOI:10.1073/pnas.1108996108 [ID-No:3]
LOCALID:2880/S 39224 [Listen-Nummer/S-Nummer]
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