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          Institute: MPI für Ökonomik     Collection: Strategic Interaction Group     Display Documents



ID: 672482.0, MPI für Ökonomik / Strategic Interaction Group
Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? : An experimental deception game
Authors:Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias
Language:English
Date of Publication (YYYY-MM-DD):2013
Title of Journal:Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume:93
Start Page:205
End Page:218
Title of Issue:Deception, Incentives, and Behaviour
Review Status:Peer-review
Audience:Not Specified
Free Keywords:financial advisors; asymmetric information; principal–agent; sender–receiver game; deception; reciprocity; experiments; voluntary payment
Classification / Thesaurus:JEL Classification: C91; D03; D82; G20; L15; M52
External Publication Status:published
Document Type:Article
Affiliations:MPI für Ökonomik/Abteilung Strategische Interaktion
Identifiers:DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.022
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