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          Institute: MPI für Ökonomik     Collection: Strategic Interaction Group     Display Documents



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ID: 673873.0, MPI für Ökonomik / Strategic Interaction Group
Can subgame perfect equilibrium threats foster cooperation? : An experimental test of finite-horizon folk theorems
Authors:Angelova, Vera; Bruttel, Lisa V.; Gueth, Werner; Kamecke, Ulrich
Language:English
Date of Publication (YYYY-MM-DD):2013
Title of Journal:Economic Inquiry
Volume:51
Issue / Number:2
Start Page:1345
End Page:1356
Review Status:Peer-review
Audience:Not Specified
External Publication Status:published
Document Type:Article
Affiliations:MPI für Ökonomik/Abteilung Strategische Interaktion
Identifiers:ISSN:0095-2583
DOI:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00421.x
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