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Search results in <Institute=MPI für Evolutionsbiologie AND Collection=Research Group Evolutionary Theory>
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Leaving the loners alone: Evolution of cooperation in the presence of antisocial punishment
Authors: García, Julían; Traulsen, Arne
Date of Publication (YYYY-MM-DD): 2012-08-21
Title of Journal: Journal of Theoretical Biology
Volume: 307
Start Page: 168
End Page: 173
Document Type: Article
ID: 610657.0
 
Full text / Content available
Direct reciprocity in structured populations
Authors: Van Veelen, Matthijs; García, Julián; Rand, David G.; Nowak, Martin A.
Date of Publication (YYYY-MM-DD): 2012-06-19
Title of Journal: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
Volume: 109
Issue / Number: 25
Start Page: 9929
End Page: 9934
Document Type: Article
ID: 610795.0
 
Full text / Content available
Emergence of responsible sanctions without second order free riders, antisocial punishment or spite
Authors: Hilbe, Christian; Traulsen, Arne
Date of Publication (YYYY-MM-DD): 2012-06-13
Title of Journal: Scientific Reports
Volume: 2
Issue / Number: 458
Start Page: 4 S.
Document Type: Article
ID: 610634.0
 
Full text / Content available
On equilibrium properties of evolutionary multi-player games with random payoff matrices
Authors: Han, The Anh; Traulsen, Arne; Gokhale, Chaitanya S.
Date of Publication (YYYY-MM-DD): 2012-06
Title of Journal: Theoretical Population Biology
Volume: 81
Issue / Number: 4
Start Page: 264
End Page: 272
Document Type: Article
ID: 608370.0
 
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Group selection and inclusive fitness are not equivalent; the Price equation vs. models and statistics
Authors: Van Veelen, Matthijs; García, Julián; Sabelis, Maurice W.; Egas, Martijn
Date of Publication (YYYY-MM-DD): 2012-04-21
Title of Journal: Journal of Theoretical Biology
Volume: 299
Start Page: 64
End Page: 80
Document Type: Article
ID: 583210.0
 
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From genes to games: Cooperation and cyclic dominance in meiotic drive
Authors: Traulsen, Arne; Reed, Floyd A.
Date of Publication (YYYY-MM-DD): 2012-04-21
Title of Journal: Journal of Theoretical Biology
Volume: 299
Start Page: 120
End Page: 125
Document Type: Article
ID: 608951.0
 
Full text / Content available
How mutation affects evolutionary games on graphs
Authors: Allen, Benjamin; Traulsen, Arne; Tarnita, Corina E.; Nowak, Martin A.
Date of Publication (YYYY-MM-DD): 2012-04-21
Title of Journal: Journal of Theoretical Biology
Volume: 299
Start Page: 97
End Page: 105
Document Type: Article
ID: 608956.0
 
Full text / Content available
Stochastic differential equations for evolutionary dynamics with demographic noise and mutations
Authors: Traulsen, Arne; Claussen, Jens Christian; Hauert, Christoph
Date of Publication (YYYY-MM-DD): 2012-04-03
Title of Journal: Physical Rewiew E
Volume: 85
Issue / Number: 4
Sequence Number of Article: 041901
Document Type: Article
ID: 609166.0
 
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The structure of mutations and the evolution of cooperation
Authors: García, Julián; Traulsen, Arne
Date of Publication (YYYY-MM-DD): 2012-04
Title of Journal: PLoS ONE
Volume: 7
Issue / Number: 4
Sequence Number of Article: e35287
Document Type: Article
ID: 610670.0
 
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Could shame and honor save cooperation?
Authors: Jacquet, Jennifer; Hauert, Christoph; Traulsen, Arne; Milinski, Manfred
Date of Publication (YYYY-MM-DD): 2012-03
Title of Journal: Communicative & Integrative Biology
Volume: 5
Issue / Number: 2
Start Page: 1
End Page: 5
Document Type: Article
ID: 609184.0
 
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Entries: 1-10  
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